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THE BASES OF THE HUMANITARIAN
DOCTRINE REEXAMINED
GLELN.N' A. MCCLI:ARYO
The only justification for any important doctrine of law is that it
contributes toward some desired social end as determined by settled eco-
nomic and social convictions prevalent at that period and place. There can
be no eternal principles so long as law deals with social values, because the
latter are constantly changing. For example, look at the interesting history
of change in the doctrine of contributory negligence. Due to the unmiti-
gated individualism of the common law, the law would not take better care
of the plaintiff than he would take of himself. Therefore, his negligence
was a complete bar to any relief from a negligent defendant. This harsh
doctrine was alleviated partially by last chance exceptions which received
birth in 1842. Today, by statutes, we see a further development in
favor of our negliigent plaintiff through notions of comparative negligence
or proportional fault, by reducing the amount of the plaintiff's recovery
based upon his- own contribution to his-injury. With these developments
no one can raise very potent objections, for after all the defendant was at
fault and, under any of these notions, the defendant must have been more
at fault in the crisis than was the plaintiff. Hence, there can be little weight
in his contention that he should escape all liability.
All important legal doctrines should be reexamined periodically to
see if shifting values in their legal and social bases demand change or modi-
fication in the doctrine itself. In reexamining these social bases there should
be no hesitancy to venture merely because a principle has been in the books
for over fifty years. Look at the recent development in Missouri in the
field of attractive nuisance, or the liability of a possessor of land to infant
trespassers who are injured while on the land. On reexamining the legal
and social bases of the attractive nuisance doctrine, the Missouri Supreme
Court decided that it should be broadened beyond the turntable cases.'
*Acting Dean and Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B., Ohio
Wesleyan University, 1917; J.D., University of Michigan, 1924; S.J.D., Harvard,
1936.
1. See Hull v. Gillioz, 130 S. W. (2d) 623 (Mo. 1939), and the discussion
of the case in (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 466. While the court endeavored to show a
legal basis for its decision, the considerations motivating the court were social.(56) 1
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This is the only way the common law can have a healthy growth. If it
cannot thus adapt itself, our judge made law will more and more be replaced
by legislation.
It is the purpose of this study to reexamine the legal and social bases
of the principle of law which permits a contributorily negligent plaintiff
to recover from a negligent defendant whose moral or social level of fault
is no different from that of the plaintiff himself, and to suggest the desirabil-
ity of a reexamination of the legal and social bases of the humanitarian doc-
trine as it is known and applied in Missouri in that situation where both
parties were inattentive to the harm threatened by their inattentiveness. 2
Certain principles in the law of negligence have been so universally rec-
ognized and accepted as achieving desired social ends that little discussion
has arisen to demand a reexamination of their usefulness or desirability.
Contributory negligence fitted into the individualism of the common law
so neatly that only fairly recently has this harsh doctrine been softened by
the application of comparative negligence or proportional fault. Last
chance principles had partially softened some of the effects of contributory
negligence without ruffling to much extent professional thinking. But the
extended care for a contributorily negligent plaintiff through certain as-
pects of the humanitarian doctrine has never been accepted by the profession
to any extent outside of MHissouri, nor has it been accepted by the profession
in M~issouri as being completely satisfactory. In this day of reexamining
critically doctrines in the light of new social objectives it seems desirable
to look again at the theories, legal and social, which have been employed
in attempting to justify a recovery by one person from another in that
situation where both have been equally inattentive to the harm threatened
by their inattentiveness.
I. THEORY OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE
A. Doctrinal Theory
It is not insignificant that it took a donkey, in the celebrated case of
Davies v. Mann,' to sponsor a departure from the general proposition that
2. This discussion is directed at the legal and social bases of the hu-
manitarian doctrine as applied to situations where both parties are inattentive
to the risk of harm. It does not purport to consider the scope of the doctrine as it
has been applied. Such problems as what constitutes the position of peril, whether
antecedent negligence of the defendant is to be included within the doctrine,
what the pleadings and instructions should show as to the obliviousness of the
plaintiff, and other problems are for another treatment which will have to be
premised on the acceptance of the doctrine.
3. 10 M. & W. 546 (Ex. 1842).
2
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a contributorily negligent plaintiff may not recover from a negligent de-
fendant. But the donkey in that case undoubtedly was less surprised that
it was responsible for the introduction of a new doctrine in the law than
future students of the law to see the limits to which a few courts have
carried the idea. That it could have been the ancestor for the doctrine of
last clear chance and such other hybrids as the doctrine of discovered peril,
supervening negligence, the humanitarian doctrine, and other variations,
was certainly far remote from either the beast or the judges in that case.
The judges there thought, although the plaintiff was negligent in permitting
the fettered donkey to be grazing unattended in the highway, that the de-
fendant being able by the use of due care just before the collision to con-
trol his team of horses and avoid injury to the donkey, at a time when it
was too late for the plaintiff to do so, it was only fair that the plaintiff's
contributory negligence should not prevent a recovery-a clear case of
physical helplessness on the part of the plaintiff at the moment of the crisis
To rescue his property.
The rationale of a doctrine which permits a contributorily negligent
plaintiff to recover from a negligent defendant took the form of a fiction.
in the early cases. But this has always been one of the ways law grows. The
fietion-was, that the rule as to contributory negligence was unchanged. The
last clear chance doctrine was clothed by the soothing dogma of proximate
-ause. to wit, that the plaintiff's negligence was a remote cause of the in-
'ur- while the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause. The in-
dividualism of the common law would not take better care of the plaintiff
than he took of himself, but beginning with Davies v. Mann this harsh
attitude began to soften through the manipulations of proximate causation.
. ix years after Davies v. Mann, an American court endeavored to put up
in full legal doctrine the last clear chance idea, and this Vermont decision
gar-e sufficient satisfaction to the profession at a day when rationalization
was very secondary to formulae. There the court said: "This leads onr
investigation to the question, whether an action can be sustained, when the
negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant has mutually co-operated in
producing the injury, for which the action is brought. On this question,
the following rules will be found established by the authorities. When
there has been mutual negligence, and the negligence of each party was the
4. For the fear that if last clear chance is recognized as a new doctrine it
would invade the domain of contributory negligence, see Nehring v. Connecticut
Co., 86 Conn. 109, 84 Atl. 301 (1912).
 Vol. 5
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proximate cause of the injury, no action whatever can be sustained. In
the use of the words 'proximate cause,' is meant negligence occurring at
the time the injury happened. In such case no action can be sustained by
either, for the reason, 'that as there can be no apportionment of damages,
there can be no recovery.' So, where the negligence of the plaintiff is
proximate, and that of the defendant remote, or consisting in some other
matter than what occurred at the time of the injury, in such case no action
can be sustained, for the reason that the immediate cause was the act of the
plaintiff himself . . . On the other hand, when the negligence of the
defendants is proximate, and that of the plaintiff remote, the action can then
well be sustained, although the plaintiff is not entirely without fault."5
This formula, which satisfied but did not explain, was (and still is)
widely accepted by the courts as the theory underlying last clear chance.'
But the most casual analysis of the meaning of proximate causeJ as used by
the courts today, clearly shows that the explanation of last chance cannot
be based on such a formula. It is elementary for the application of the
last chance doctrine that plaintiff has been contributorily negligent. This
cannot be unless the negligent act of the plaintiff is necessary to make
defendant's negligently created situation effective in harm-that is, he
has contributed to the situation which the defendant's negligence has made
effective to do harm. By the very idea of contributory negligence the
plaintiff's negligent act is one of the proximate causes of his injuryP It
5. Trow v. Vermont Cent. R. R., 24 Vt. 487, 494 (1852). This language is
found in many of the earlier Missouri cases. In many of them there was little
direct evidence of any contributory negligence at all. See Brown v. Hannibal
& St. J. R. R., 50 Mo. 461 (1872), where the question was whether a trespasser
using a common path across a railroad track was owed a duty; O'Flaherty v.
Union Ry., 45 Mo. 70 (1869). In other cases the court was really dealing with a
last chance situation. See extended discussion in note 57, infra.
6. See exhaustive comment notes in (1934) 92 A. L. R. 47, and (1939) 119
A. L. R. 1041. This was the position taken by the first writer to attempt a dis-
cussion of the humanitarian doctrine. Otis, The Humanitarian Doctrine (1912) 46
AM. L. REV. 381, 385.
7. Adams v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 27 Mo. 95 (1858), traces the development,
beginning with Davies v. Mann, through the Trow case and accepts it. That was
a case of property (steamboat), and perhaps our first real last clear chance case
in Missouri. Of course, last chance cases where property is injured must be
treated as involving physical helplessness. The recent editorial notes in (1934)
92 A. L. R. 47, and (1939) 119 A. L. R. 1041, show that many of the best con-
sidered modern cases still take this as the explanation. One of the most complete
statements in the later cases is found in Nehring v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn.
109, 84 Atl. "301 (1912). There the court was greatly bothered with the idea
of the doctrine of last clear chance invading the contributory negligence domain.
But it was able to convince itself that, if properly worked out on the lines of
proximate cause, there was no new doctrine or independent principle at all in-
consistent with the contributory negligence rule.
8. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) § 463: "Contributory negligence is conduct
on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he should
4
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is very (lear that it is a cause in fact, a cause sine qua non: but for the
plaintiff's negligence the injury would not have happencd. Tt' it would have
happened anyway, the plaintiff's conduct could not be considered a cause
in fact, and there would be no fault in the plaintiff. Furthermore, if
plaintiff's contributory negligence is at all present in this sense-where it
is necessary to make the dangerous situation negligently created by the
defendant in harm-it must be one of the legal causes of his own injury.
Under the most restrictive formula of legal or proximate causation, namely,
that the injury must be the natural and probable consequence, in the sense
of foresight, of his negligent conduct, the plaintiff's negligence will be one
of the proximate causes of his own injury. Where a man's negligence has
put himself or his property in a position of peril, that negligence must be
a proximate cause of the injury which follows. Here the likelihood of the
injury that resulted was one of the very things that made his original act
negligent. Probable consequences have always been considered proximate
consequences by courts and juries alike.9
Unless there is a different idea lurking behind the idea of legal or prox-
imate causation where it is applicable to the plaintiff than where it is to be
applied to the defendant, which would be shocking, and "hardly conducive
to clear thinking,"'' 0 the theory in the last chance cases that plaintiff's
negligence was not a proximate cause of his injury completely breaks down
where the negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant combined to
injure a third person."1 There is no question here but that the third person
may recover from either or both on the theory of proximate cause, yet as
between the two defendants in a separate suit the injured defendant may
rec'over from the other on a theory of last chance.12
conform for his own protection and which is a legally contributing cause, co-
operating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff's
harm."
9. James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine (1938) 47 YALE L. J.
704, 707. This writer ably rejects the proximate cause thc)ry of the last chance
doctrine.
10. Clark, Tort Liability for Negligence in Missouri (1916) 12 U. OF Mo. L.
BULL. L. SER. 3, 29.
11. See Bradley v. Becker, 321 Mo. 405, 11 S. W. (2d) 8 (1928), where it was
held as between concurrent or joint tort-feasors, each guilty of negligence as to
a third person, that neither can say that the burden of liability shall be cast
on the other, as neither can invoke the last clear chance doctrine.
12. In Colorado & S. Ry. v. Western L. & P. Co., 73 Colo. 107, 214 Pac. 30(1923), one wrongdoer, having been compelled to pay damages as to an innocent
third person, was allowed to recover those damages from another wrongdoer
who had, as between the two, a last clear chance. There is nothing novel in such
result. An analogy exists in the cases where the negligence of one may be im-
puted to another and either or both be held responsible for injuries resulting
to a third person; yet as between themselves the situation is as if no third person
was involved. See Notes (1929) 62 A. L. R. 442; (1933) 85 A. L. R. 630.
[Vol. 5
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Therefore, to attempt to explain last clear chance cases on grounds of
legal (proximate) cause merely clouds the issue and clutters up an opinion
with so much talk. When used as a formula for such cases, the courts are
using high sounding language barren of usual meaning. Proximate cause
is a convenient device for an arbitrary stopping point beyond which the
investigation will not be carried (or bear scrutiny, either). Proximate
cause formulae take the interpretations of natural cause, direct cause, nat-
ural and probable cause, foreseeable cause, substantial factor, efficient cause,
and a host of other interpretations. Under any interpretation the plain-
tiff's contributory negligence is one of the proximate causes of the injury.
But here is a ritual convenient for stopping the investigation of causation,
not because of logic, but because of a desire to achieve an end based on
social desirability. Proximate cause has not infrequently been a conven-
ient ritual for such purpose. Yet this explanation was considered satis-
factory in the early Mlissouri decisions and is still frequently asserted. 13
The last chance doctrine cannot be explained by logic but only by
looking at the economic, social and political ideals of the period in which
it came into being. These often are inarticulate factors in the cases, to
be sure. but what important doctrine of the law is based entirely upon
rationalization? Not only do these factors help to formulate new principles
of the law, but they give direction to old established doctrines. They are
what has been called the "ideal element" in the law which gives direction
to what the profession considers as the body of law.
B. A Rational Theory
Many modern cases expressly repudiate the proximate cause theory of
last clear chance and treat the doctrine as a true exception to the notion
that a contributorily negligent plaintiff cannot recover from a negligent
defendant. 4 No attempt is made to explain the doctrine on the logical
argument of proximate cause, although the same courts may explain the
result in terms of proximate cause which, in these cases, is merely a conven-
ient term to express a conclusion in legal verbiage which has been reached
from other and different considerations. The theory of these cases is not
13. Adams v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 27 Mo. 95 (1858), and Huelsenkamp v.
Citizens' Ry., 37 Mo. 537 (1866), both based on Trow v. Vermont Cent. R. R., 24
Vt. 487 (1852), cited supra note 5, and cases collected in Notes (1934) 92 A. L. R.
47, and (1939) 119 A. L. R. 1041. For other early Missouri cases so explaining
the result, see cases cited by Otis, supra note 6, at 384, n. 10.
14. See Notes (1934) 92 A. L. R. 47, and (1939) '119 A. L. R. 1041; RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS (1934) § 467, 479, 480, taking this position.
6
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so open to attack for their basis is not in legal doctrine but in popular no-
tions of fairness to aecident victims-perhaps more from a feeling of sym-
pathy for an injured man, for the family or those dependent upon him, the
enormity of medical bills and other human factors. The real basis of this
theory of the doctrine of last clear chance is that, even where both parties
have been negligent, the last responsible actor, according to the community's
sense of fairness, should bear the loss. The problem then becomes one of
determining the last responsible actor. This is the notion behind su,.h ex-
planations of last clear chance that are paraded under the name of "dis-
covered peril," "supervening negligence," "humanitarian doctrine," and
applied to accidents which have happened as a result of the combined
negligence of both parties, but where it can be established that one had a
later opportunity to avoid the accident. It is, in fact, the explanatiou of
the cases which profess to find the logical proximate cause of the accident.
The real problem, then, in any ease in which the doctrine of last clear
chance is asserted is to determine who was the last responsible actor in the
situation in which both plaintiff and defendant have been negligent. The
difficulties -at one& become apparent. At least two factors must be present
before the last responsible actor may be identified in those cases of concur-
ring negligence. The first is that the breach of duty on the part of the de-
fendant, performance of which would have saved the plaintiff from the
effects of his own negligence, must have arisen or continued after the peril
arose. The 'Missouri cases identify this situation by contrasting it with
primary negligence, the latter meaning breach of duty prior to the time
when the peril arose but not continuing subsequent to the plaintiff's negli-
gence. Another way of expressing the same idea is to say that the doctrine
is not applicable where the only negligence of the defendant was ante-
cedent. On the other hand, the defendant's breach of duty may have con-
menced prior to the plaintiff's negligence in placing himself in the danger
zone, yet if that duty was a continuing one, the performance of which,
after the plaintiff has placed himself in the positior. of peril, would have
enabled the defendant to avert the accident, the defendant has the last
chance and is the last responsible actor. The typical example is the failure
of the employees of a train to keep a lookout at highway crossings. The
breach of this duty may begin prior to the time when plaintiff's position of
peril could be discovered, but it continued down to the time when plaintiff
had come into the position of peril, and performance of the duty would
have disclosed his position in time for the defendant to avert it.
The second factor which must be present, before the defendant can be
[Vol. 5-
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a last responsible actor in these cases, is that the defendant could have
avoided the accident by the exercise of due care under the conditions that
existed when the peril of the injured person was, or should have been,
discovered.
IT. ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS SITUATIONS
A. Discovered Physical Helplessness of the Injured Person
In determining the responsibility where both plaintiff and defendant
have contributed to the perils of the situation, the cases usually have been
classified into four groups. This classification remains quite adequate for
our purpose. The first is where the plaintiff through his negligence has
placed himself or his property in a position of peril from which he cannot
now, when the danger is imminent, by the exercise of due care, extricate
himself. The defendant discovers the peril and realizes, or should realize
from the information he possesses, the plaintiff's situation in time to
prevent the injury in the exercise of due care."' This is the simplest case
and one in which any court accepting last clear chance theory of liability
will apply the doctrine. Courts limiting the doctrine to "discovered peril,"
or to "conscious last clear chance," have no difficulty in accepting this
type of case. The determination of the last responsible actor requires no
philosophic niceties, for in the laymen's view, compared with the defend-
ant's opportunity, the negligent conduct of the plaintiff has come to rest
and is no longer operative, at least insofar as the idea of responsibility is
concerned. It is not an important consideration which negligence began
first; the vital fact is to find which party, in the performance of duty,
had the last opportunity to avoid the injury. To be sure, the plaintiff's
negligence has contributed to the situation which made the defendant's
negligence effective to produce harm and was, therefore, one of the legal
or proximate causes of his own injury; but it has been shown that legal
doctrine does not explain last clear chance. In some instances the defend-
15. Id. at § 479: "A plaintiff who has negligently subjected himself ) a risk
of harm from the defendant's subsequent negligence may recover for harm
caused thereby if, immediately preceding the harm, (a) the plaintiff is unable
to avoid it by the exercise of reasonable vigilance and care, and (b) the defend-
ant (1) knows of the plaintiff's situation and realizes the helpless peril involved
therein; or (2) knows of the plaintiff's situation and has reason to realize the
peril involved therein; or (3) would have discovered the plaintiff's situation
and thus had reason to realize the plaintiff's helpless peril had he exerciscd the
vigilance which it was his duty to the plaintiff to exercise, and (c) thereafter
is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then
existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff."
8
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ant's conduct in this type of case will be sufficient to show a disregard of
the probable consequences, such an indifference to a known peril to others,
that not infrequently the court will call such conduct wanton and reckless,
to which negligence of the plaintiff is no defense."! The two ideas-last
clear chance and wanton and reckless misconduct-may be found in the
same case, the court either not recognizing the logical distinction between
the two or, where the facts are not clear in this respect, resting the decision
on either ground.
B. Undiscovered Physical Helplessness of the Injitred Person
The second situation has a wider scope than the first. Here we have
the same physical inability of the plaintiff by the present exercise of due
care to escape from the perilous situation in which he has placed himself
by his antecedent negligence, but the defendant is still able by the exercise
of due care to avert the accident if he discovers the situation, and the
relation of the parties is such that the defendant owes to the plaintiff the
duty of reasonable vigilance. The defendant does not see, but in the
exercise- of-his duty- owed to the plaintiff he should have--seen and appreci-
ated the plaintiff's helpless peril in time to avoid injuring him. While it
is truea that both have been negligent, the plaintiff's negligence has culmi-
nated in a position of peril from which he cannot extricate himself even by
the present performance of due care on his part. On the other hand, the
defendant's wrong is later than the plaintiff's and at a time when he
could control the situation, if only he had taken the precautions which it
was his duty to take. In the crisis he is the last responsible actor, according
to a laymen's sense of fairness, since he had the last opportunity." Most
courts recognize this as falling within the concept of last clear chance, al-
though it has been remarked that the last chance is not so "clear" as
in the first situation. 8 Typical examples of this situation ar where
one negligently catches his foot in a switch frog on a railroad h.ack, or is
caught on a railway trestle from which he cannot escape in the crisis and
is struck by a train operated without the proper lookout on the part of
the train crew which was their duty at this point to keep, and which, if
kept, would have enabled them, by the use of the means within their control
and under the conditions then existing, to have averted the accident.
16. This is because the plaintiff's conduct is not of the same moral or social
level of fault as that of the defendant.
17. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 479, set forth supra note 15.
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The locus of this factual set-up is necessarily greatly restricted in the
railway cases since most courts find no duty on the part of the operators of
trains to keep a lookout for trespassers, such lookout being required only
at highway crossings and other places where numerous persons are known
to cross."9 Furthermore, the situation is restricted to those cases where,
assuming a duty to exercise care was owed to the plaintiff, it definitely
would have been possible for the defendant in the exercise of due care to
avert the accident even had he discovered the danger. The mere possibility
as it appears after the accident that he could have averted the injury in the
performance of his duty, had he discovered the situation and realized
the danger, is not sufficient.
C. Discovered Mental Obliviousness of the Injured Person
The third situation is where the plaintiff's inadvertance places him in
a position of peril, but he is physically able to extricate himself at any
moment before the accident if he uses his senses and becomes conscious
of his peril. However, as a result of his negligent inattention he remains
oblivious of his danger, while the defendant sees the plaintiff and knows
the facts from which he realizes, or from the facts ought to have realized,
plaintiff's obliviousness to danger in time to avert the accident, but he
fails to utilize with reasonable care his ability to avoid the harm. Here the
negligence of the plaintiff without actual knowledge of the danger, con-
tinuing up to the moment of impact, or essentially so, stands over against
the negligence of the defendant who has actual knowledge of the situation.
If last clear chance is explained on proximate cause a recovery would be
denied here.20  But most courts regard the defendant as having the last
opportunity of avoiding the harm and, therefore, he is the last responsible
actor. It is true that either party could, up to the moment of the accident,
have avoided the injury in the exercise of due care and, therefore, each was
the proximate cause of the result. But their opportunities when compared
are easily seen to differ greatly. At the crisis, the opportunity of the plain-
tiff is limited by his mental alertness and, because of his inattention or
preoccupation, he is at the mercy of others; the defendant's opportunity is
not mental but physical, not inattention but failure to act reasonably with
19. As to constant trespassers over a limited area, see the leading Missouri
decision of Ahnefeld v. Wabash R. R., 212 Mo. 280, 111 S. W. 95 (1908), eiting
many decisions.
20. See Note (1934) 92 A. L. R. 47, 86, 150.
10
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relation to a known position of danger and, because of his information, lie
is in control of the situation. Failure to use care under these circumstances
may be said actively to increase the danger after the plaintiff's negligence
has allowed the situation to get beyond his control. The plaintiff may
have the physical ability to avoid it, up to the last moment, but lie does
not have the mental alertness to control his physical reactions; the defend-
ant has both the mental and physical capacities to avoid the injury. This
comparison in such cases does not place the explanation of the doctrine on
comparative negligence but does show who is the last responsible actor.
Here, as in the first situation, those courts restricting last clear chance to
"discovered peril" or to "conscious last clear chance" accept this type
of case as falling under the application of the doctrine.
Of course, the defendant in many situations is entitled to assume that
the plaintiff will exercise due care with reference to his position of peril,
and-until he has reasons to suspect the contrary, he cannot be said to
know or have reasons to believe that the plaintiff is in any danger. Thus
a motorman of a street car may presume that the driver of an automobile
will stop before getting into a place of danger of collision with the street
car. If there was nothing in the movement of the automobile or in its
manner of approach as it neared the crossing, or in the actions of the
driver to indicate the contrary, the motorman is entitled to assume that
the plaintiff is paying or will pay reasonable attention to his surround-
ings..2 The defendant's realization of the obliviousness of the plain-
tiff to the peril is looked at objectively from the understanding of the
ordinary reasonable man. Thus he may be liable if he fails to exercise
reasonable care to avoid injury after he should have realized the plain-
tiff's obliviousness to the danger, regardless whether or not he actually
recognized such ignorance of the peril.2 2  'Where the facts show a dis-
21. Jordan v. St. Joseph Ry., L., H. & P. Co., 38 S. W. (2d) 1042 (Mo. 1931)
(automobile-street car); Clark v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 319 Mo. 865,.6 S. W.(2d) 954 (1928) (automobile-railroad).
22. Undoubtedly many Missouri cases would support the objective theory
of knowledge but the question need not be clearly raised because the defendant
is liable if he should have seen and realized the danger in time to avoid it, under
the fourth category yet to be discussed. The same idea is involved in those cases
where the defendant is entitled to assume, until he has reason to suspect the
contrary. that the plaintiff is paying or will pay reasonable attention to his
surroundings. Clark v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 319 Mo. 865, 6 S. W. (2d) 954(1928); Jordan v. St. Joseph Ry., L., H. & P. Co., 38 S. W. (2d) 1042 (Mo. 1931).
For other cases, see St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Wilkerson, 46 Ark. 513 (1885);
Blytheville. L. & A. S. Ry. v. Gessell, 158 Ark. 569, 250 S. W. 881 (1923) ; Nichols
v. Chicago. B. & Q. R. R., 44 Colo. 501, 98 Pac. 808 (1908) ; Director General of
Railroads v. Blue, 134 Va. 366, 114 S. E. 557 (1922).
[ Vol. 5
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regard for obvious consequences and an indiffereic.e to peril, the court
may characterize such conduct as wanton and re.kless, to which the neg-
ligence of the plaintiff is no defense, and rest the decsion on that ground,
the facts appearing to support either this theory or that of last clear
chance. 23
D. Undiscovered Mental Obliviousness of the Injured Person
The fourth and last situation to be considered in completing the va-
rious factual situations which may be examined in any classification of
cases in an attempt to find the last responsible actor, on whom respon-
sibility may be sought to be placed where both parties have been negligent
with reference to the injuries received, is one that should be the easiest
and simplest to solve on any legal basis. Here the plaintiff is not left in
a physically helpless condition by his negligence, but he can extricate him-
self from danger at any time before the accident if lie becomes con-
scious of his peril. The defendant does not see the plaintiff, but if the
defendant had been using due care he could have discovered the plain-
tiff's dangerous condition, due to the latter's inattentiveness, in time to
have avoided the injury. Both parties are mentally oblivious with re-
gard to the same peril; both are negligent with reference to the same
danger; each party has an opportunity to avoid the injury if he comes out
of his careless, mentally oblivious condition; neither party had a chance
to avoid the accident that the other did not have. It is not a last chance
situation in any respect.
For purposes of clarity, however, a digression must be made at this
point and the full consideration of this type of case postponed until an
opportunity is had to show what all this may have to do with the subject of
the paper, namely, the humanitarian doctrine as known and applied in
Missouri.
III. THE MISSOURI HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
The humanitarian doctrine as understood by the bench and bar of
Missouri is a "variant" of the last clear chance doctrine and ine-udes
all three last chance situations discussed previously; but it incldes more
in that it covers the fourth situation which by no stret'h of legal reason-
23. Cavanaugh v. Boston & M. R. R., 76 N. H. 68, 79 Atl. ;94 (1911). See
Note (1909) 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 427, on the relationship of the two principles.
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ing can be considered a last chance situation. 4 Therefore, in criticising
any aspect of the humanitarian doctrine as it is known in Missouri, it
must be very clearly understood that the writer does not consider the
doctrine assailable in its application to the first three situations, for
these arc widely accepted as last chance cases; instead, all the criticisin
about the humanitarian doctrine pertains only to its application to the
fourth situation. Iere quite obviously it is not a last ,hane doctrine.
The writer does not mean to convey any impression that it is all bad;
quite to the contrary, three-fourths of it is good and fairly unassailable on
legal analysis. It is the one-fourth content of the doctrine that is so
questionable, and in the remainder of this discussion only this phase of
the doctrine, its application to the fourth factual situation, is included with-
in the focus of the discussion. The first three factual situations have been
developed only to bring into contrast the fourth which is t-eated under the
humanitarian doctrine as though it were of the same general type as the
first three.
Returning then to the analysis of our so-called fourth situation, it is
desirable to repeat the factuar set-up by way of contrast to the other three
types of cases. Here the plaintiff is not left in a physically helpless con-
dition by his failure to use due care in getting into a position. of peril;
he can extricate himself from the danger by a vigilant use of his eyes,
ears. and physical strength almost at any moment before the accident if
he becomes conscious of his peril. The defendant does not discover the
plaintiff's position of danger; but if the defendant had been using due
care (this, of course, assumes that a duty is owed to be on the lookout
for persons at this place), he could have discovered and realized the plain-
tiff's-position of peril in time to have avoided the injury.25  Both parties
924. Thus it is of no consequence what brings about or continues the situation
of peril. It may be through the physical helplessness of the one imperiled to
extricate himself from his environment, or it may be through the obliviousness
to the dangers of the situation. The formula stated in its simplest terms contains
these facts: "(1) Plaintiff was in a position of peril; (2) defendant had notice
thereof (if it was the duty of defendant to have been on the lookout, constructive
notice suffices) ; (3) defendant after receiving such notice had the present
ability, with the means at hand, to have averted the impending injury without
injury to himself or others; (4) he failed to exercise ordinary care to avert such
impending injury; and (5) by reason thereof plaintiff was injured." Banks v.
Mlorris & Co., 302 Mo. 254, 267, 257 S. W. 482 (1924).
25. In the case of trespassers, as to whom the defendant ordinarily owes
no duty of vigilance to discover their presence, actual discovery, of course, is
necessary before the defendant can be found guilty of negligence at all. If the
trespassers over a limited area are sufficiently numerous and the activity is
sufficiently dangerous, they are given the protection of a licensee to whom a duty
to keep a lookout is owed. See note 19, supra.
[ Vol. 5
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are mentally absent. Either party physic-ally could, in the exercise of due
care, have avoided the accident had he become mentally aware of the
crisis. The negligence of each party in failing to discover the danger is
continuous and concurrent. Each was a proximate cause of the accident.
Neither had a chance to avoid the accident that the other did not have.
Each had an opportunity to prevent the injury had he become aware of
the surroundings.
In the early cases in which this situation was presented and in which
the doctrine germinated, the defendant was in charge of some vehicle or
machine which was heavy enough to withstand the force of the impact,
at least to come off with slight injury compared to that of the plaintiff's.
But this, by its very nature, implies that it was not only larger in bulk
but more difficult to bring into control when the crisis arose. The plain-
tiff being equally as negligent as the defendant in not paying attention
to the possibilities of peril to himself, it seems inescapable that he may
be said to have been the last responsible actor as he had a later opportunity,
since he was in a more mobile position either as to himself or as to the
vehicle or machine which he is operating than was the defendant. Re-
verse these facts as to mobility and you reverse the parties plaintiff and
defendant in the way the case will come up. 28 Putting the same idea in a
slightly different way, the plaintiff was able to avoid the accident up
26. The same idea is expressed in the Comment Note (1934) 92 A. L. R. 47,
141: "In some situations, it would seem that the negligence of the injured person
in failing to exercise due care to discover his own danger is greater than the
negligence of the defendant in failing to discover the situation, although there
may have been a duty on his (defendant's) part to discover it. For example,
the negligence of a person walking or standing on a railroad track without keeping
a lookout for trains which, from the very nature of the place, he has every
reason to expect may approach on tracks intended for that purpose, seems greater
than the negligence of the train employees in failing to keep a lookout, even
assuming their duty in that regard, on the chance that some careless person may
be on the tracks oblivious to his surroundings. It may be that this consideration
is, in the view of some of the courts, outweighed by the fact that the train em-
ployees are in charge of an instrumentality fraught with greater potentialities of
harm than those incident to the mere presence of the individhal on the tracks."
The latter observation is not convincing to the writer because a train crew has
other and equally important duties owed to numerous persons who either are on
the train or who have property in shipment on the train which, when weighed
against a mobile plaintiff who has no one to look after but himself, seem con-
siderably more important from a social point of view. If all that a train crew
had to do was to keep a lookout, there might be something to the observation. But
the comment adds: "Even such considerations fail in the case, for example, of
a collision between two automobiles of equal potentiality for harm. In such a case,
as upon the present hypothesis the parties are charged equally with the failure
to discover the danger, and the negligence of the plaintiff in that regard con-
tinues at least as long as defendant's negligence, there seems to be no ground for
applying the doctrine in favor of the plaintiff rather than the defendant, except
that, as the event proved, it was the former rather than the latter who was in-
jured."
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until a later moment by taking the simpler precautions, either by step-
ping aside and thus avoiding the impact, or by moving out of the danger;
whereas the defendant to avoid the injury would have had to begin to
control his movement at an earlier point of time. In no sense can the
defendant's opportunity be called a later one, nor can lie be charged with
being the last responsible actor. It seems implicit in such situations
that the plaintiff is the last responsible actor in considering the possi-
ble opportunities of each.
There is another approach to a consideration of the negligences of
these two parties in a situation of this type which, at first sight only, seems
to make the plaintiff less culpable in failing to discover his own danger than
that of the defendant who has failed to exercise due care to discover the
peril of another. This arises in those cases where the defendant is in
charge of a train or other instrumentality which is fraught with great po-
tentialities for harm and his negligence is in failing to keep a lookout for
some person who may be in a position of danger oblivious of his sur-
roundings, while the plaintiff's negligence consists of approaching or
remaining in a place of danger without keeping a lookout for the instrumen-
tality he has every reason to expect to approach him. But the factors which
are to be considered. in- determining the magnitude of the risk which the
negligence of each involves brings the parties out in about equal positions
again. 'Moreover, one should be expected to take better care of himself than
should be demanded from others. Furthermore, in the ordinary carrier
case, the operator of the instrumentality owes duties to many others at
the same time, such as passengers, which involve his attention in handling
carefully the instrumentality. If there is any inequality in the respective
negligences, again it seems to favor the defendant by finding the plain-
tiff more at fault. Even these considerations are inapplicable in the cases
where the collision is between two objects of equal potentiality for harm,
as for example in the automobile cases. The only ground for permitting
the plaintiff rather than the defendant to recover in such a case is
that the former rather than the latter was injured. Legal reasoning would
enable the defendant to use the doctrine as a defense, but the doctrine
is not based on legal reasoning and it is not available to the defendant
except, possibly, by counterclaim. But in no supreme court decision has
the defendant's use of it stood up because of the great fog any court will
get into in trying to give a set of instructions on the same theory for
[ Vol. ")
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each partyY It thus seems necessary, as a prerequisite, for a party to
get the benefit of the doctrine to receive some injury and then beat the
other in the dash to the clerk's office so as to qualify as party plaintiff.
If it were available as a defense, the original theory for the humanitarian
doctrine would be shifted to a theory of comparative negligence or pro-
portional fault-a theory to be highly desired if it is frankly so con-
sidered and stripped of its fictional aspects involved by both parties
pleading the doctrine.
To include this type of case under the designation of the same doctrine
as applied to last chance situations clearly shows that the courts have
been employing talk in the air when they have attempted to give a doc-
trinal basis for the whole humanitarian doctrine in the concept of prox-
imate cause. When the approach to the four situations is made by
beginning with the last, it is seen that the whole scope of the humanitarian
doctrine developed from a theory of absolute liability wherever the plain-
tiff is in a position of peril; it matters not whether this position of peril
is due to physical inability to extricate himself or from mental oblivious-
ness; the defendant has notice thereof or, if it was the duty of the de-
fendant to have been on the lookout, constructive notice is enough; the
defendant after receiving such notice had the present ability with the
means at hand to avert the impending injury without injury to himself
or others; he failed to exercise ordinary care to avert the impending in-
jury, and by reason thereof plaintiff was injured.28  Thus it is of no
consequence that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in bringing about
or continuing the situation of peril. Contributory negligence never has
been a defense to absolute liability.
29
How did it happen that a doctrine developed which requires the one
who happens not to be injured to take better care of the plaintiff than
the plaintiff is required to take of himself, a fact which cannot be de-
termined until after the impact and until it is discovered which one of
27. See the predicament in State ex rel. Grishan v. Allen, 124 S. W. (2d)
1080 (Mo. 1939); and the hesitancy in Ashbrook v. Willis, 338 Mo. 226, 89 S. W.
(2d) 659 (1936), transferred to the Kansas City Court of Appeals, 231 Mo. App.
460, 100 S. W. (2d) 943 (1937). Also, see the observation by Judge Ellison in
Perkins v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 340 Mo. 868, 898, 102 S. W. (2d) 915, 932 (1937).
28. See Banks v. Morris & Co., 302 Mo. 254, 257 S. W. 482 (1924).
29. For example, where liability without fault is imposed against the pos-
sessor of wild animals or abnormally dangerous domestic animals for harm done.
For cases, see 2 Mo. DIG. (1930) tit. ANIMALS, § 7; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938)§ 515. Against one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity, see Buchholz v.
Standard Oil Co., 211 Mo. App. 397, 244 S. W. 973 (1922) ; RESTATEMENT, ToRTs(1938) § 524.
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the parties is so unfortunate as to be the one injured? Why does such a
doctrine of absolute liability applied to this factual set-up continue in
the face of constant attack as to its doctrinal bases? In the balancing of
all the considerations is there any social justification for its retention?
These are some of the questions which remain to be considered.
IV. ORIGIN OF THIS PHASE OF THE HuMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
It was quite accidental that this phase of the humanitarian doctrine
was given birth. In the Missouri decisions prior to 1886 a recovery by
a contributorily negligent plaintiff against a negligent defendant was
limited to strictly last clear chance situations embraced within the three
types of cases developed previously in this paper. The progenitor of
the last chance theory which enabled a contributorily negligent plaintiff
to recover, Davies v. 1Mann, was cited with approval. Likewise, the ease
of Trow v. Vermont Central R. R., 30 with its contribution of the idea of
proximate cause as the juristic basis for last chance theory, was accepted
as a landmark. Last chance doctrine and supporting theory were moving
along in the early Missourf decisions in much the same fashfon as in the
great bulk of the states at that time. Prior to 1886, no Missouri decision
has been found permitting the plaintiff to. recover which would not prop-
erly fall under the first three situations, or last chance cases. That is,
they were cases in which the plaintiff's contributory negligence had placed
him in such a position of physical helplessness that he could not, when
the danger was imminent, by the exercise of due care, extricate himself;
the defendant either discovered the peril or through the exercise of due
care (that is, a duty was owed to discover) could have, and should have,
discovered the plaintiff's helplessness."1  Or they were cases of mental
obliviousness on the part of the plaintiff where the court strongly intimated
that there would have been a recovery if this condition had been dis-
30. 24 Vt. 487 (1852).
31. Discovered or undiscovered physical helplessness, situations 1 and 2:
Adams v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 27 Mo. 95 (1858) (injury to moored barge, the
decision closely following the first last chance case of Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W.
54; (Ex. 1842)); O'Flaherty v. Union Ry., 45 Mo. 70 (1869) (for death of infant
child killed in street by defendant's car); Isabel v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R., 60
M!o. 475 (1875), and Donahoe v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry., 83 lo. 543 (1884)
(train struck an infant child who had wandered on the track); McKeon v.
Citizens' Ry., 42 Mo. 79 (1867) (dictum); Burham v. St. Louis & I. M. R. R., 56
'Mo. 338 (1874); Meyers v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 59 Mo. 223 (1875); Adams
v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R., 74 Mo. 553 (1881) (undiscovered physical helplessness
but no duty owed to be on the lookout); Werner v. Citizens' Ry., 81 Mo. 368
(1884) (drunk lay helpless in street on track of defendant) ; Swigert v. Hainibal
& St. J. R. R., 75 Mo. 475 (1882) (drunk boarding train).
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covered in time to avoid the injury. That the court was speaking of
discovered mental obliviousness (situation three) in Harlan v. St. Louis,
Kansas City & Northern Ry.,y is shown by the italicized portion of the
opinion and by the concurring opinion. In Kclley*v. Hannibal & St. Joseph
R. R.,11 the judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on the ground that
the defendant could not have stopped even had the plaintiff been discovered
in his mentally oblivious condition."
In fact, in the only cases prior to 18861-- which clearly involved facts
of mental obliviousness on the part of the plaintiff which defendant could
have discovered in time to have prevented the injury (situation four),
the court reversed judgments for the plaintiff and very explicitly pointed
out in one case that there could be no recovery unless the mental oblivious-
ness was actually discovered. 6 There an instruction for the plaintiff had
been given which was broad enough to permit a recovery even though his
contributory negligence had left him mentally oblivious, but where the
defendant in the exercise of due care could have discovered the peril in
time to have avoided the injury:
"Even if the jury should believe, from the evidence, that
the plaintiff was guilty of negligence or carelessness which con-
tributed to the injury, yet if they further believe, from the evi-
dence, that the agents or servants of defendant, managing the
locomotive or machinery of the defendant with which the injury
was inflicted, might have avoided the said injury by the use of
ordinary care and caution, the jury will find for plaintiff." '37
The court said that this instruction "given for the plaintiff is in di-
rect conflict with what has been expressly declared to be the law in the
following cases. ." (citing Missouri cases which either were
not last chance cases at all, or dealt with discovered mental obliviousness,
32. 64 Mo. 480 (1877) (the facts show that the plaintiff's husband was not
a casual trespasser but was using a "frequented path" across the tracks); 65
Mo. 22 (1877) (on rehearing).
33. 75 Mo. 138 (1881).
34. See Karle v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. R., 55 Mo. 476 (1874);
Bell v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R., 86 Mo. 599 (1885).
35. Fletcher v. Atlantic & Pac. R. R., 64 Mo. 484 (1877); Zimmerman v.
Hannibal & St. J. R. R., 71 Mo. 476 (1880); Henze v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry.,
71 Mo. 636 (1880) ; and see very strong dictum in Harlan v. St. Louis, K. C. & N.
Ry., 65 Mo. 22 (1877). All of these opinions were by Judge Henry. Also, see the
same idea approved in Karle v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. R., 55 Mo. 476
(1874) ; Price v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry., 72 Mo. 414 (1880) ; Turner v. Hannibal
& St. J. R. R., 74 Mo. 602 (1881). Cf. Hixson v. St. Louis, H. & K. R. R., 80 Mo.
335 (1883).
36. Zimmerman v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R., 71 Mo. 476 (1880).
37. Id. at 480.
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or with situations one or two, physical helplessness). The court went oil
to say:
"In Isabell t,. The R. R. Co., supra, the court observed (Wag-
ner. J.) : 'In order to make a defendant liable for an injury when
the plaintiff has also been negligent, or in fault, it should appear
that the proximate cause of the injury was the omission of the
defendant, after becoming aware of the danger to which the
plaintiff was exposed, to use a proper degree of care to avoid
injuring him.' 'e have italicized that portion of the paragraph
which the instruction under consideration ignores.' '3
However, the basis for allowing the plaintiff to recover in those eases.
where both parties were mentally oblivious and both negligences continued
up to the collision (situation four), was-germinating in the language which
the court was beginning to use quite steadily in some of these cases.
This language in these early cases was purely dictun since a recovery
was denied on the ground that the peril was not discovered, or that there
was no time within which the defendant could have acted in the crisis
to avoid the injury. Furthermore, the history of the dictham shows rather
weak support for the first few years, so that it was questionable during the
SO's whether it would not be entire'y discarded when the facts called for
its full application. Perhaps one member of the court, Judge Henry,
was principally responsible for its phrasing; but lie was quite opposed
to its application to our problem type of case.
In tracing its history, the beginning can be seen in the case of Harlan
i. St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern RyA9  Here the deceased, not a
casual trespasser but one using a frequented path across the tracks, stepped
from behind a railway car onto the defendant's track in front of an
engine. The supreme court denied the plaintiff a recovery on the ground
that there was no time to stop the train so as to prevent the injury even
had the train crew seen the deceased." On rehearing, Judge ITenry, in
writing the majority opinion, said:
"But if after discovering the danger in which the party Lad
placed himself, even by his own negligence, the company could
have avoided the injury by the exercise of reasonable care, the ex-
ercise of that care becomes a duty, for the neglect of which the
company is liable. When it is said, in cases where plaintiff has
been guilty of contributory negligence, that the company is lia-
ble. if by the exercise of ordinary care it could have prevented
38. Id. at 484. It may be observed, however, that the Isabell case, from which
the court quoted, was one of physical helplessness.
39. 64 Mo. 480 (1877) ; 65 Mo. 22 (1877) (on rehearing).
40. 64 Mo. 480 (3877).
I 'of. )
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the ae idnt, it is to be understood that it will be so liable, if by
the exercise of reasonable care, after a discovery by defendant of
the danger in which the injured party stood, the accident could
have been prevented, or if the company failed to discover the
danger through the recklessness or carelessness of its employees,
when the exercise of ordinary care would have discovered the
danger and averted the calamity. . . . The evidence that
Harlan's negligence contributed directly to produce the injury,
was clear and uncontradicted, and there was no evidence whatever
tending to show that after the deceased got on the track, it was even
possible to prevent the accident." (Italics Judge Henry's) '
A concurring opinion in the same case further shows that the court
in the mentally oblivious cases would require discovered peril, just as
Judge Henry was emphasizing it by his italicized words:
"Now if there had been any testimony tending to show that
the defendant could, by the exercise of proper care, after discover-
ing the danger to which the deceased was exposed, have avoided
injuring him, then the verdict should be permitted to stand.
There was not only no such testimony, but there was testimony to
the contrary, and it was therefore properly held, not that the ver-
dict was against the weight of the evidence, but that there was
no evidence whatever to support the verdict.'4"2
It seems quite clear that that portion of Judge Henry's opinion, per-
taining to liability if the defendant could have discovered the plaintiff's
mental obliviousness in the exercise of ordinary care, was not only inap-
plicable to the facts, but was not even considered to be anything more than
dictum even to the judge himself by virtue of his italicized words. Judge
Hough's concurring opinion perhaps points to the dictum, not expressly,
but by agreeing only with that part of the majority opinion dealing with
discovered mental obliviousness.
Three years later, in Zimnmerman v. Hainibal & St. Joseph R. R.,43
the first constructive notice humanitarian case dealing with mental ob-
liviousness (situation four) was directly presented in the instructions to
the jury, and in spite of the earlier broad dictum by Judge Ifenry in the
Harlan case, the same judge held that an instruction covering this situa-
tion was "in direct conflict with what has been expressly declared to be
the law" in preceding Missouri cases. The cases cited as the declared
law of Mlissouri either did not involve last chance situations or had to do
with discovered peril cases.-' The writer of this opinion for the court
41. 65 Mo. 22, 25 (1877).
42. Id. at 26, opinion by Hough.
43. 71 Mo. 476 (1880).
44. The cases cited were: Karle v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. R., 55 Mo.
476 (1874); Nelson v. Atlantic & Pac. R. R., 68 Mo. 593 (1878); Cagney v.
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then shows why an instruction on constructive notice in the mentally
oblivious situation is not proper, even where the evidence would support
such an instruction, by quoting from the earlier case of Isabell i). St.
Joseph R. R.:
"In order to make a defendant liable for an injury when
the plaintiff has been negligent, or in fault, it should appear that
the proximate cause of the injury was the omission of the defend-
ant, after becoming aware of the danger to which the plaintiff was
exposed, to use a proper degree of care to avoid injuring him." '45
He further emphasizes his point by saying:
"We have italicized that portion of the paragraph which the
instruction under consideration ignores.""
But the next year, 1881, the same Judge Henry in Kelley v. Hannibal
& St. Joseph R. R.,17 in reversing a judgment for the plaintiff on the
ground that the defendant could not have stopped in time to have avoided
the injury even had he been discovered, reverts to his loose and inclusive
language used by him in the Harlan case, which would make the de-
fendant liable in the mentally oblivious cases even on constructive notice.
The same careless dictum, however, by bobbing up again in the supreme
court decisions was bound to be pressed on the court. Its very repetition,
although by way of gratuitous dictum, would be seized upon by plain-
tiff's lawyers against railroads at a period when the big corporations, par-
ticularly the railroads, were considered the object of special privilege.
The first judicial application by the court of the constructive notice
doctrine applied to mental obliviousness (situation four) was made in
1886 in a series of cases, the most significant of which is Donoltue v. St.
Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry.4 There the majority of the court,
speaking through Judge Norton, said:
Hannibal & St. J. R. R., 69 Mo. 416 (1879); Harlan v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry.,
64 Mo. 480 (1877). Last chance facts or contentions were not presented in any of
these cases. Isabel v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R., 60 Mo. 475 (1875) (discovered
physical helplessness); Harlan v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry., 65 Mo. 22 (1877), set
forth in text above in which, by dictum, where there is mental 'obliviousness on the
part of the plaintiff it is necessary that the defendant have discovered the peril
in time to have averted the injury.
45. 71 Mo. 476, 484 (1880).
46. Id.
47. 75 Mo. 138 (1881).
48. 91 Mo. 357, 2 S. W. 424 (1886). There is earlier intimation of growing
judicial sentiment in this direction in Frick v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry., 75 Mo.
595 (1882), by way of dictum. In Welsh v. Jackson County Horse R. R., 81 Mo.
466 (1884), decided two years earlier, it is not clear whether the facts showed
physical helplessness or inattention. The basis for the opinion is the former.
Another decision, decided earlier in the same year as the Donohue case, Bergman
v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 88 Mo. 678 (1886), involved the same question with the
I Vol. 5
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"The jury was substanlially told by them (the instructions),
that, in approaching the crossing, it was the duty of Donohue to
stop, look, and listen for a train, and that if he failed to do so
he was guilty of such negligence that plaintiff could not recover,
unless the jury further found that defendant's agents in charge
of the train either saw, or, by the exercise of ordinary care, could
have seen, the peril that Donohue was in, in time to have avoided
injuring him." (Italics supplied) 41
The court then observed that the instructions conformed to the law
as laid down in three Hissouri decisions. But the first of these, Frick v.
St. Lois, Kansas City & Northern Ry.," turned entirely upon the prob-
lem of primary negligence, the court holding specifically that there was
no contributory negligence because of the tender age of the plaintiff. The
second case, cited by the court to sustain its new principle of construc-
tive notice, was the Kelley case set forth above which contained the steadily
developed dictum, the case itself being one where there was no moment
that the train crew could have stopped in time to avoid the injury even
had they seen the plaintiff. The third case, Werner v. Citizens' Ry.," cited
by the court to sustain the instruction upheld in the Donohue case, had
to do with the physical helplessness of an intoxicated man who "lay, or
fell down, on the defendant's track and remained there until run over
by the car. . . ." Of course, such a case was a true last clear chance
case (situation one or two), so that an instruction covering both discovered
physical helplessness and constructive notice of the physical helplessness,
where there was a duty to keep a lookout in the public streets, was prop-
er.
It is very significant that two judges dissented, apparently because the
instructions holding a defendant liable on constructive notice in the Don-
ohue case went beyond any actual holding up to this time. One of the
dissenters was Judge Henry, the very judge who had developed this
theory in the careless dictum in the earlier decisions, including the Kelley
case, and who had written the opinion in the Werner decision, both of
which were cited as the authority by the court in the Donohue decision.
Thus it is quite apparent that the very judge who had developed the con-
structive notice of liability, even though the plaintiff was contributorily
same result. But the court passes over the point so briefly that the case is not
a significant one for our purpose. Also, decided in the same year, and based upon
the Donohue case, is Keim v. Union Ry. & Transit Co., 90 Mo. 314, 2 S. W. 427
(1886).
49. 91 Mo. 357, 365, 2 S. W. 424, 427 (1886).
50. 75 Mo. 595 (1882).
51. 81 Mo. 368 (1884).
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negligent, in his own thinking was applying it only to the cases of phy-
sical helplessness (situation two), not to the mentally oblivious cases (sit-
nation four). This observation is reinforced further by recalling that tle
same judge six years earlier in the Zimmerman case had expressly de-
dared that such an instruction (liability based on constructive not ie
in situation four) "was in direct conflict with what has been expressly de-
clared to be the law" in the Missouri decisions up to this time.
Reviewing in summary fashion the decade ending with the Donohue
decision in 1886, we see in the judicial language the notion of constriuictive
notice creeping in by way of dictum, being applied to situation two (phy-
sical helplessness and where there is a duty on the defendant to use care
to discover), and even denied as a basis for liability in situation four. But
the formula that a contributorily negligent plaintiff could recover if the
defendant "saw, or, by the exercise of ordinary care could have seen, the
peril . . . in time to have avoided injuring him" began to be re-
peated in its entirety with such regularity in the cases in which a carrier
was the defendant, usually where it was entirely gratuitous, that it was
only a matter of time before the formula would be accepted as the law
governing all situations, whether they involved a physically helpless or a
mentally oblivious plaintiff. Only the judge who was so largely respon-
sible for the development of the formula apparently realized the neces-
sity of restricting it to the first two situations (physical helplessness) and
that its constructive notice feature was not applicable to the fourth sit-
uation (mental obliviousness). Having been repeated so often as dictum,
it now appears as a legal formula, full-fledged, the court continuing to
cite the same decisions to support the formula as have been discussed above,
without any attempt at further analysis of those cases.52
The formula as now developed was as yet unnamed. Its christening
came very soon in the case of Keilny v.Missotri Pacific Ry. " where the
name "humanity" was first applied in connection with the fornnla, and
out of this came the term "humanitarian doctrine"5 4 It is particularly
interesting to see that the "humanity" idea of the formula was first ap-
52. In 1886, a group of cases riveted the formula into the law of Missouri:
Dunkman v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry., 95 Mo. 232, 4 S. W. 670 (1888) ; Kelly v.
Union Ry. & Transit Co., 95 Mo. 279, 8 S. W. 420 (1888) ; Guenther v. St. Louis,
I. M. & S. ly., 95 Mo. 286, 8 S. W. 371 (1888) ; Eswin v. St. Louis, I. MD. & S. Ry.,
96 Mo. 290, 9 S. W. 577 (1888); and see Williams v. Kansas City, S. & M. R. R.,
96 Mo. 275, 9 S. W. 573 (1888).
53. 101 Mo. 67, 13 S. W. 806 (1890).
54. The rule had been called "humane" in an earlier case of Kelly v. Union
Ry. & Transit Co., 95 Mo. 279, 8 S. W. 420 (1888).
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plied to the constructive notice portion in a case which may have been ei-
ther physical helplessness or mental obliviousness. But the difference was
apparently without significance to the court. The formula in words had
become detached from such differentiation on the facts. Outside of Mis-
souri, the profession still thinks of the humanitarian doctrine as limited
to this one situation of constructive notice applied to mental obliviousness,
the other three being considered actual last chance situations, whereas the
bench and bar within the state think of the doctrine by virtue of the
general formula which makes it applicable to all four situations. This
is why it is so difficult for lawyers outside the State of Mlissouri to under-
stand what a -Missouri lavyer really means when he talks the language
of the humanitarian doctrine.
Since the doctrine finds its godfather in the Kellny case, it is desirable
to look at that case quite fully. The accident happened on the levee in
St. Louis as the plaintiff, a rag peddler, was driving his one-horse wagon.
The defendant's track was laid on the levee. At a certain point on the
levee, the plaintiff found the space on each side of the track, for a dis-
tance of about fifty feet, occupied by wagons, leaving an open way be-
tween them occupied by defendant's track as the only way for him to
pursue his journey unobstructed. In this passage the east wheels of the
wagon, as he drove north, were on the inside of the west rail of the
track, and his west wheels on the outside. After going a distance of forty
or fifty feet, the hind wheel of his wagon was struck by the defendant's
train, which was going at a negligent rate of speed in violation of the
city ordinance and without warning. The evidence for the defendant
tended to show that, as the train was passing, the plaintiff's horse began
to back, and backed the wagon up against the train; that the plaintiff
was not driving on the track as alleged by him. The judgment for the
plaintiff was reversed because of error in the instructions given by the
court on its own motion. The significant portion of the opinion, as it
pertains to the constructive notice feature, is that it seems to base the
"humanity" notion with conduct that may be designated as "wilful, reck-
less or wanton disregard of human life":
"We know of but one exception to the rule that where an
injury is the product of the joint concurring acts of negligence of
both plaintiff and defendant the plaintiff cannot recover, and that
is an exception made, on grounds of public policy and in the inter-
est of h umanity, to prevent and restrain as far as may be a wilful,
reckless or wanton disregard of human life or limb, or property,
undcr any circumstances, and that is when the injury was pro-
duced by the concurrent negligent acts of both plaintiff and de-
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fendant, yet if the defendant, before the injury, discovered or by
the exercise of ordinary care might have discovered the perilous
situation in which the plaintiff was placed, by the concurring neg-
ligence of both parties, and neglected to use the nieans at his
command to prevent the injury, then his plea of plaintiff's contrib-
utory negligence shall not avail him. This exception proeeeds not
upon the theory that the defendant has been guilty or anol her and
independent act of negligence which is the sole cause of the injury
and which must be charged as a separate and independent (ause
of action, but upon the ground that the negligence he was theni in
the very act of perpetrating was characterized by such reckless-
ness, wilfulness or wantonness as that he shall not be heard to
say that the plaintiff was also guilty of contributory negligence."
(Italics supplied)5
Regardless of the fact that, in naming the doctrine, the court linked
the "humanity" notion with conduct which was designated as "wilful,
reckless or wanton disregard of human life", the constructive notice fea-
ture of the doctrine has not been so restricted in its subsequent development
and, therefore, wilful, reckless or wanton misconduct is not a part of the
doctrine, although there may be at times an overlapping of the two no-
tions from the facts of particular cases. The same result is reached under
either theory of responsibility, since contributory negligence is no defense
to either. This makes it quite unnecessary then. under the MNissouri de-
cisions to refine d-efendTant's conduct-to see whether it was merely negligent
or whether it was wanton and reckless, except where the degree of culpa-
bility may have a bearing on the damages assessed. But the difference
between negligence and wanton misconduct is distinct and marked. Con-
duct designated as negligent consists of merely failing to exercise care
where a risk of injury may be foreseen, whereas conduct designated as
wanton and reckless is applied to situations where the defendant consciously
disregards his duty to use care, knowing the chances for harming some one
or property are very great, but indifferent whether injury will result or
not." Such misconduct falls short of being wilful in that lie does not
desire the injury to the plaintiff, but the courts give the same effect to
such misconduct as if it had been wilful, insofar as permitting a contrib-
utorily negligent plaintiff a recovery. Realistically, it is a refusal to com-
pare the faults where one has acted so indifferently to the consequences in
55. 101 Mo. 67, 74, 13 S. W. 806, 808 (1890).
56. For an adequate distinction between negligence and wanton misconduct,
see Atchison. T. & S. F. Ry. v. Baker, 79 Kan. 183, 98 Pac. 804 (1908), and
RESTATEIENT, Toars (1934) §§ 282, 500. In Murphy v. Wabash R. R., 228 Mo.
56. SO. 128 S. W. 481, 485 (1910), Judge Lamm states that no longer is the
humanitarian doctrine linked with willfulness.
[ Vol. 5
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cases where there is a conscious realization of the probability for harm.
The levels of fault of the parties are not the same, and the one cannot be
set off against the other. It is clearly seen that the humanitarian doctrine
threw off any such limitation early, for the conduct of the plaintiff, in
the fourth situation, may be of the same moral or social level as that of
the defendant.
Once the doctrine was entrenched firmly into the law of Missouri its
importance as a legal doctrine became one of administration-how far it
was to be extended. That is, the problem now becomes one of scope. To
what extent is it to be carried? What constitutes the position of peril?
What must the pleadings and instructions show as to the obliviousness of
the plaintiff ? Is the antecedent negligence of the defendant to be included
within the "humanity" notion? A discussion of the administration of
the doctrine which includes these and other problems must be left for a
later treatment. Our purpose here is to examine the origin of the doc-
trine, to see how it grew out of last chance cases, and to appraise it in an
effort to see whether or not it is desirable to continue it!"
57. There is other language in some of the earlier cases which on desultory
reading might be taken as the background for the humanitarian doctrine in its
application to situation 4. There was a notion developing in the cases, prior to
the formulation or recognition of last chance situations, that although the plain-
tiff failed to use due care which contributed remotely to the injury, yet if the
defendant's negligence was the immediate cause of the injury the defendant was
liable. The earliest pronouncement of this notion, that contributory negligence
was not always to be a defense to a negligent defendant, is found in Huelsenkamp
v. Citizens' Ry., 37 Mo. 537 (1866). In that case, however, the court found no
contributory negligence, hence the statement was gratuitous. The same state-
ment appears again, where the court actually found no contributory negligence,
in Morrissey v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 43 Mo. 380 (1869) ; 47 Mo. 521 (1871). Also,
see Liddy v. St. Louis R. R., 40 Mo. 506 (1867), where it is not clear that the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent. In Brown v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R.,
50 Mo. 461, 465 (1872), the court approved an instruction based upon the notion
developed by way of dictum in these earlier cases: "Even if the jury should believe
from the evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence by carelessness which
contributed to the injury,-yet if they further believe from the evidence that the
agents or servants of the defendant, managing the locomotives or machinery of
the defendant with which the injury was inflicted, might have avoided the said
injury by the use of ordinary care and caution, the jury will find for the plain-
tiff." However, it was dictum again, because the case turned on whether the
plaintiff was owed a duty, the court deciding only that a duty was owed to this
sort of a trespasser who was one of the public using this path over the property
of the defendant. Also see O'Flaherty v. Union Ry., 45 Mo. 70 (1861)) (again grave
doubt if contributory negligence existed; anyway it would b, a last chance
case under situation 2).
The interesting idea of this early development is that it takes proximate cause
language as developed in the Trow case and changes its wording so that it looks
like an instruction to cover situation 4. The notion was carried over also into
the noncarrier cases. See Walsh v. Mississippi Valley Trans. Co., 52 Mo. 434
(1873) ; Schaabs v. Woodburn Sarven Wheel Co., 56 Mo. 173 (1874).
So soon as last chance situations began to be formulated the Missouri court
began to turn this loose language into those situations and thus tie it in directly
with the last chance doctrine. See this development in Karle v. Kansas City, St. J.
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V. A N APPRAISAL OF TilE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE ASPECT OF Till-,
HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO A MENTALLY OBLIVIOUS
PLAINTIFF
Since the constructive notice aspect of the humanitarian doctrine caii-
not be explained on legal analysis, there being no last responsible ac.tor,
and its early origin in Missouri law appears accidental, what is the real
explanation for it? An appraisal of any well known legal doctrine will
turn on its relation to a particular period. If one seeks to appraise the
social value of the humanitarian doctrine in its application to situation four
in the period when it came into the Missouri law, one will be less critical,
perhaps, than in an attempt to appraise it under existing social values.
One cannot disconnect the birth and development of the constructive notice
aspect of the doctrine, as applied to cases of inattentiveness on the part of
both plaintiff and defendant, from the social values of the period which
saw the rapid development of the railroads in Missouri-the period .follow-
ing the Civil War to the close of the century. Not only were the rail-
roads alleged to be seeking legislative favors through doubtful methods,
at least to the lay mind, but along with that activitity there was little
effort made in that period on their part for the protection of the pub-
lie- frumr injuries. Engineering science had not developed air brakes,
warning signals at crossings, warning lights, and numerous other safety
devices to protect the public. Screeching, smoking monsters passing
through a rural countryside, with a noise and speed unknown before that
period, killing farm stock, and injuring or killing people, caused a psycho-
logical reaction most noticeable with juries and judges in the suits against
the railroads." It was one way to get even with special privilege. Further-
more, the railroads had in many localities mulcted the investors through
watered stock and business practices which did not contribute to public
relations. The very name of corporation in that period, invoking a feel-
ing of ruthless power, aroused the sympathy of the average individual to
& C. B. R. R.. 55 Mo. 476 (1874); Matthews v. St. Louis Grain Elev. Co., 59 Mo.
474 (1875): 31eyers v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R., 59 Mo. 223 (1875); Maher
v. Atlantic & Pac. R. R., 64 Mo. 267 (1876); Harlan v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry.,
65 Mo. 22 (1877) (see italicized words); Nelson v. Atlantic & Pac. R. R., 68 Mo.
593 (1878); Rains v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 71 Mo. 164 (1879); Zimmerman
v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R., 71 Mo. 476 (1880) (such language in an instruction
complained of by the court); Price v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry., 72 Mo. 414 (1880)
(such languaze in an instruction called "an abstract proposition of law, erroneous
it is true. . . ."); Straus v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. R., 75 Mo. 185
(1881) (instruction in these words held bad).
58. See. for example, Gorman v. Pacific R. R., 26 Mo. 441 (1858).
[V7ol. -)
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protect the common citizen who may have been injured by their operation,
particularly where it was thought able to pay. It was also a period in the
Mliddle West when corporations did not exactly fit into the notion of an
agricultural democracy.
These, together with a natural sympathy for an injured man and his
dependants, are the important reasons for the inception of the humanitarian
doctrine as applied to situation four. Throughout the early cases there is no
clear notion of legal doctrine or justification given for the notion that the
uninjured, mentally oblivious defendant in control of a train or street
car should pay an equally mentally oblivious plaintiff, vho of the two
was perhaps more to blame in the crisis, when all considerations are
weighed.5 9 The only notion that is clear is the social one that the carrier
should pay. It is a doctrine of absolute liability applied to a particular
situation, and embellished by a fine sounding term. There is evidence of
this in the very early cases against carriers, even before last chance ideas
had developed. In fact, in one of the early decisions the analogies used
were the cases based upon absolute liability.6 0 Sometimes the same result
was reached by the manipulations of proximate and remote causes which,
as meaningless talk in the air, gave an appearance of legal respectibiity
to a conclusion reached on social considerations.6 The criticism is directed
wholly at the use of legal garb where none existed.
Even as a theory of absolute liability the humanitarian doctrine can-
not be justified. All through the history of the common law, wherever
absolute liability has been imposed. the defendant has introduced into the
community a new danger which was greater than any social value to be
59. See the observation by Valliant, J., in Schmidt v. St. Louis R. R., 149
Mo. 269, 285, 50 S. W. 921, 925 (1899) ; "The doctrine upon which the instruction
disposed of in the foregoing paragraph is founded, that is, the liability of defend-
ant notwithstanding plaintiff's own negligence under certain circumstances, has
been so often declared by the courts of this State, and of other States, that it is
thus recognized in this opinion; but the writer has never been able to understand
the rationale of it. To attempt to reason it out on the principles on which the law
of negligence is based leads to a self-contradiction of those principles, from which
the only escape is in an effort to divide negligence into degrees; apd to attempt
to apply the doctrine to any given case is to attempt to ascertain to what
extent the negligence of the one or the other operated to produce the result.
Take the case of a man walking on a long high railroad trestle-a very careless
and dangerous undertaking-a train comes and the engineer sees the man in
ample time to stop before it reaches him, the engineer knows the man can not get
off the track yet he runs his train on and over him. The law of negligence has
nothing to do with that case."
6;0. Blrown v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R., 50 Mo. 461 (1872).
61. Sce instruction three for plaintiff in Huelsenkamp v. Citizens' Ry., 34
Mo. 45 (18m); Morrissey v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 43 Mo. 380 (1869) (a very clear
ease of such mnlamilations).
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derived from his conduct, according to the social and economic values
prevailing at the time and place-something unusual, extraordinary, and
fraught with exceptional peril. This is the reason keepers of wild animals
and keepers of domestic animals, with known vicious propensities to
cause harm, are held to an insurer's liabilily."; Today, where. certain ultra-
hazardous activities are carried on, absolute liability is applied, uiless the
social gain from such activities is too important to be inipeded by such
strict responsibility as, for example, in the use of automobiles.":' Aviation,
blasting, the storage of explosives, oil drilling, and other activities are
still considered as introducing a danger which is not as yet so offset by its
social importance as to reduce responsibility from that of an insurer to a
basis in negligence. The whole doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher," in which
an English court applied this theory of liability to the instances where
the defendant had brought into the community a substance which, if it
escaped. was likely to do mischief, was pronounced only twenty years be-
fore the humanitarian doctrine crystalized. Mluch of the notion of abso-
lute liability has come into the law at a time when economic activity has
been thrust upon an agriculturaI community."
In the 70's and 80's the Missouri court was in effect saying that the
dangfau whiLohrailroa.s andstreet car companies were introducing into the
community was so ultrahazardous, compared with their social utility, that
the defendant carrier should make good those harms which resulted from
a failure to discover the peril of the plaintiff, even though the misconduct
of the plaintiff was of the same sort as that of the defendant, both being
62. On the other hand, a keeper of a domestic animal, which he does not have
reason to know to be abnormally dangerous, but which is likely to do harm
unless controlled, is liable in negligence only. This applies to bulls, stallic . rams,
and other stud animals. The rule of liability without fault is not applied here
because the social utility of such animals is sufficient to justify their being kept,
even though there is more risk than with other animals of the same general
class. See RESTATEMENT, TORTs (1938) § 518; Note (1937) 106 A. L. R. 1418.
63. An ultrahazardous activity has been defined: "An activity is ultra-
hazardous if it (a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land
or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost
care, and (b) is not a matter of common usage." RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1938)§ 520.
64. L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
65. For example, Professor Bohlen in explaining Rylands v. Fletcher says:
"Nor should it be forgotten that, in England, the dominant class was the landed
gentry, whose opinion the judges, who either sprang from this class or hoped to
establish themselves and their families therein, naturally reflected. To such a
class it was inevitable, that the right of exclusive dominion over land should
appear paramount to its commercial utilization; to them, commerce and manu-
facture, in which they had little or no direct interest, appeared comparatively un-
important." Bohlen, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF ToRTs (1926) 369.
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mentally oblivious."" To be sure, this is not making the carrier absolutely
liable for all harms caused by it, yet it does carry the insurers liability
part way in such situations.
Furthermore, it was a convenient device to shift the loss from the group
least capable of bearing it to a form of activity which could distribute the
burden to those who benefited from the activity in the form of increased
rates-a form of social insurance. This economic theory is undoubtedly
an afterthought, a specious reason to bolster a principle really based on
more earthy considerations.
VI. TiE NEED FOR A NEW APPRAISAL OF SOCIAL VALUES IN THE
SITUTATIONS WhVjERE BOTH PARTIES ARE INATTENTIVE
Do the conclusions reached over fifty years ago apply under present
social values-? In spite of refinements in regard to safety devices, ac-
cidents still happen in which carriers are involved. Even so, do the same
social considerations apply today which make it desirable to apply absolute
liability to this situation! It is very certain that there is an ever increasing
social interest in transportation of all sorts. No longer do the people look
upon carriers with the same fear that they are ultrahazardous things. Even
farm animals appear bored with their presence. There are few com-
munities that do not feel dependent upon the social usefulness of railroads
to increase the prosperity of the community by enabling their products
to be marketed, and to obtain the absolute necessities for economic ac-
tivity.
Furthermore, the social utility of transportation companies varies with
the rates that must be charged to enable them to serve the public. No
longer are the railroad corporations looked upon as embodying special
privileges or mulcting the public. There has been considerable doubt
in recent years whether or not they can survive in spite of present high
rate. 6  . The present attitude on the part of the general public is chang-
ing to one of sympathetic interest in their continued existence and service,
though no such change appears on the part of jlries. Yet. where a
principle of law requires that they be made to pay if they do not take
66. The dangerous instrumentality idea is very apparent in the earlier
carrier cases. See Kelly v. Union Ry. & Transit Co., 95 Mo. 279, 8 S. W. 420
(1888); Gorman v. Pacific R. R., 26 Mo. 441 (1858).
67. For a picture of the changed economic picture of the railroads in the
past fifty years, see statistics in opinion by the Interstate Commerce Commission,
Passenger Fares and Surcharges, 214 I. C. C. 174 (1936). Also see the Annual
Reports (Interstate Commerce Commission) for the past decade.
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better care of the plaintiff than he may take of himself, there is a vast
expense in paying judgments, settling suits, employing enlarged legal
staffs to take care of this sort of claim. There is no longer the assurance
that this rule forms a convenient device to shift the loss to a form of ac-
tivity which can distribute the burden in the form of increased rates, a
form of social insurance resulting in the larger social good.
But the greatest need for a new appraisal in the situation where both
parties are inattentive and equally at fault is seen in the cases other than
railroads and street car companies, particularly the automobile cases.
Here it is impossible to argue that absolute responsibility should be im-
posed on the defendant for introducing a dangerous instrumentality into
the community which has increased the risks for harm, especially where
the plaintiff is also driving an automobile. Even in England where the
principle of absolute liability was first introduced and perhaps carried to
greater lengths, one of the exceptions engrafted on the principle was where
the plaintiff was making a similar use of his property as was the defend-
ant.' 8 Even where the plaintiff is not driving a car, the idea that an
automobile is to be considered a dangerous instrumentality has received
little support even in the early cases. Its social usefulness more than off-
sets the-added risk to the community. The family purpose doctrine and
other forms of vicarious liability for harms done by automobiles driven by
others than the owner have not been worked out on lines of absolute re-
sponsibility.
Furthermore, the'economic argument (Social insurance) that the
humanitarian doctrine, in cases where both parties are inattentive, is a
convenient device to shift the loss from him who is least capable of bear-
ing it to the defendant who can distribute the burden to those who bene-
fit from the activity (an argument made in favor of its application to the
carrier cases, where the burden can be shifted to the public in the form
of increased rates) is absurd here. The only shift in the burden here is
based upon which one, equally culpable, happens to be the injured per-
son. There is nothing humanitarian in such a case unless one is ready
to subscribe to a rule of the law that an injured man regardless of his
own culpability should be compensated for his injuries. Under a form
of compulsory insurance, like workmen's compensation insurance, this
68. Eastern & South African Tel. Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Co. [19021
A. C. 381. Electricity from the defendant's tramway escaped into the plaintiff's
cable in the sea.
[Vol. 5
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burden could be somewhat shifted to the group. But as it stands today the
automobile driver must carry the full responsibility in these cases, even
where his fault is no greater than that of the plaintiff. If he seeks the
cheaper method for protecting himself by liability insurance, he finds
that he is compelled to pay rates which are much higher in 'Missouri be-
cause of this responsibility than in other states where last clear chance
principles are retained.' 9 But query, does the humanitarian doctrine really
protect here? Only a small proportion of automobile drivers can afford to
carry liability protection at the present rates, and a reading of newspaper
accounts would lead one to believe that the bulk of the accidents are caused
by the group of automobile drivers who are not likely to have insurance,
and are at the same time execution proof. So as a device for social insur-
ance, it does not work except in a small proportion of injuries. The MIis-
souri courts failed to recognize the possible basis for distinction in the
application of the humanitarian doctrine in the situation where the de-
fendant was a carrier and where he was an ordinary citizen. The hu-
manitarian doctrine where both are inattentive had been applied about
forty years when the automobile cases first presented the same problem.
It had become a rule, the reasons for which had been forgotten.
The whole doctrine should be reexamined and all the social implica-
tions fully considered anew, to see whether our courts are reaching a just
social result, especially in their failure to distinguish between the agencies
involved in producing the harm. The doctrine has become so embedded
69. The following table speaks for itself. The rates are those of a large
mutual insurance company on a Chevrolet, Ford, or Plymouth car, operated for
pleasure and family purposes by a resident of the "remainder of the state;" i.e.,
any part of the state excluding certain large cities (in Missouri, St. Louis
(suburban and urban), Kansas City, St. Joseph, Springfield, and Joplin; in
Iowa, Des Moines, Council Bluff, Davenport, Fort Dodge, Clinton, Ottumwa,
Cedar Rapids, Burlington, Waterloo, Sioux City, and Dubuque; etc.). In general,
rates for the large cities in these states are in the same relation as rates for
"remainder of state," but there are obvious difficulties in selecting cities for the
comnparison.
$5,000/$10,000 personal
injury liability $14 $14 $15 $20 $15 $17.55 $19.50 $32
$5,000 property liability 5 6 5 8 6 5.55 6.44 $ 7
Total liability insurance premiiumi $19 $20 $20 $28 $21 $23.10 $25.99 $39
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in the law of 'Missouri that our courts accept all four situations as em-
braced in the scope of the doctrine without investigating the theories, legal
or social, on which it rests. Occasionally, a court will question the sound-
ness of its application to situation four, but it is content to rest its final
decision on precedent. Little effort is nmade to eompare the so-ial atti-
tudes at its birth with our present attitudes. Again it should be noticed
that this paper does not question the types or situations covered by the
humanitarian doctrine which are last chance eases, and the suggestion for
a reexamination does not apply to them.
The new appraisal should be grounded solely on a reexamination of
the social interests involved.-- Law as a social institution, the cement which
holds society together, deals with human relations in al effort to satisfy
claims, wants, needs and desires of life. These claims, wants, needs and
desires of one man usually conflict with those of many others. The ad-
justment of conflicting interests necessarily involves an evaluation of the
interests according to some standard. While this standard has been formu-
lated in various ways, in various periods of legal history, it has always
been that whichi would- promote the socfar interests afffeted, such as the
social interest in the general security, the social interest in freedom of ac-
TiOn. the-soeial interest in-free-.economic activity, the social interest in the
conservation of natural resources, the social interest in general progress,
the social interest in the individual life of the members of society, and
various other social objectives.7 1  These are variables depending upon the
general notions and culture of a people in any given period.' A more
70. That the courts did weigh the social factors in that period though often
inarticulately expressed in the opinion, see Gorman v. Pacific R. R., 26 Mo. 441
(1858).1 71. The various social interests have been grouped as follows: The social
interest in the general security (activities that threaten the social group in its
existence, such as the general safety, health, peace and order, acquisitions, trans-
actions) ; the social interest in the security of institutions (domestic relations,
religious, political, economic); the social interest in general morals; the scial
interest in the conservation of social resources (natural resources, protection
and education of dependents and defectives, reformation of delinquents, protection
of those economically dependent) ; the social interest in the general progress
(economic, political, cultural, aesthetic) ; the social interest in the individual life
(individual free self -assertion, opportunity, conditions that assure at least a
minimum of human life under the conditions of life of the period and place). This
classification is taken from POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE
(4th ed. 1928) 60ff., where an exhaustive bibliography on the subject. is given.
72. For example the social interest in the general security in the earliest
period of the common law was to keep the peace; in the next period in securing
peace and order by means of legal remedies; then came the period of equity when
an effort was made to turn moral duties into legal duties; then the general
security was thought of in terms of individual rights; today it seems to be in
terms of the social interest in the individual life. The usual way of stating this
interest in the general security has been in terms of public policy. See Pound,
[Vol1. 5
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usual method used by the judges for expressing the same notion is to
speak of this standard as one based on public policy. But each claim, want.
desire, or interest receives protection only to the extent of the social sig-
nificance implicit in it as compared with the other conflicting social in-
terests. In other words, this standard for evaluating claims requires that,
in advancing a particular interest, other interests not be invaded too far.
Our detailed rules, principles, doctrines and standards of law are mere
efforts to carry out in crystallized form the notions of the larger social
value of certain conduct after a weighing and balancing of all the interests
involved.
Involved in every case coming under the humanitarian doctrine is a
conflict of social desires, each of which seeks to control the solution of the
case. All cannot control. The relative worth of the different social values
may very well vary with the facts of different situations to which the hu-
manitarian doctrine has been applied, so that any attempt to apply the
doctrine to all cases involving the same general fact background of the
accident and injury may tend to defeat certain social objectives. It is,
therefore, necessary to examine more closely the social problems in the
different situations to which the doctrine has been applied in the ju-
dicial history of the state. Since the only justification for any doctrine
of law is that it contributes in bringing about a desired social end. it is
necessary to have those ends clearly in mind.
Then too, the evaluation of these social ends may vary with the vary-
ing social values of the period. What seemed to be a good result under
such an evaluation fifty years ago may not prove to be so at the present
time, due to other considerations being brought into the solution of the
case which were not present earlier, perhaps because of social and economic
changes. In this light, the humanitarian doctrine is not an eternal prin-
ciple and, therefore, it should be critically reexamined periodically as
should all important principles of the law. It is not in itself a sufficient
justification for any doctrine that it has been in the books for over half
a century. Its only justification is whether it helps toward a desired social
end of the period and place as determined by settled economie and social
convictions prevalent at the time and place.
The objectionable phase of the humanitarian doctrine in its origin
The Enid of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines (1914) 27 HARV. L.
RFV. 195; The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought (1914) 27 id. 605;(1917) 30 id. 201.
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was a reversion to the earlier notions of absolute liability, at a period when
some compromise was felt necessary between conflicting social interests
and prejudices brought about by a change in the economic and social life
of the state, to which the railroads and street car companies were eoiitribut-
ing. It was a means for accommodating legal doctrine to new eonditions.
But in the past twenty-five years the automobile has brought aboul. a
further change to which the humanitarian doctrine cannot be ac(.oimiodat(d.
In this respect, at least, it is bound to be a transitional doctiiine only,
and the court in the automobile cases, and perhaps in the carrier .ases.
may either abandon the position it has taken in situation four and return to
the application of contributory negligence as barring a plaintiff from recov-
ering from a defendant who is no more culpable, or the court will continue
along the path on which it is going but will work out some new principle
for the distribution of the loss which may satisfy more modern ideas of
fairness and right, e. g., a principle of comparative negligence or propor-
tional fault. If the court on a reexamination of the doctrine decides that
it is a sound social doctrine and should be retained, let it so tell us the
reasons why an6 not worry about putting it up in legal garb. Of course,
compulsory insurance for carriers and drivers of automobiles might pro-
duce the fairest result, but this is outside the scope of judge made law.
[Vol. 5
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